ABSTRACT Vehicular Ad hoc Network is an emerging area as a key component of the intelligent transport system. Despite the immense researches going on in this area, it is yet to be deployed at its full scale due to lack of trust, safety, and confidentiality in the network. Moreover, the security algorithms proposed till now are complex, and calculations involved are difficult to be completed within the strict real-time constraints. This paper introduces the SignReCrypting Proxy Re-signature scheme, which reduces the time taken for encryption at sender side as well as for decryption at receiver side. Signcryption reduces the computation cost by converting two steps of signature and encryption into one, whereas re-encryption and re-signature enable Alice to decrypt and sign a message on behalf of Bob. These three terminologies altogether with group signature make the proposed algorithm robust, secure, and efficient. The compromised vehicle is revoked from group using dynamic accumulators, and security is verified using automated validation of Internet security protocols and applications.
I. INTRODUCTION
Even after several advancements in vehicular technology, road accidents and immense traffic are inevitable fate of the common folks travelling via roadways. Inexperienced driving may not necessarily be the cause; bad weather conditions, health related issues and other uncontrollable situations may cause serious vehicle crashing [1] . The increasing cases of smog in leading cities of world, where drivers are not able to see what lies ahead of them, are very distressing. To control these in an automated way, Vehicular Ad-hoc Network (VANET) is a popular technology in which automobiles can communicate with each other to avoid collisions and jams. Based on the routing scheme used in network, vehicles may send messages only to vehicles/RSUs ahead of them ignoring the behind ones or may communicate only with pre-declared authenticated members e.g., in a group. Whatever the routing technique or channel selecting criteria is, examining it on network before deployment is a necessary overhead, to avoid any unknown interference. Since vehicles need to communicate in real time, even a single minute delay in message delivery is not permissible. Any unauthenticated message from/to an intruder can interrupt the communication and damage the entire network. Therefore, countless researches are going on to obstruct the nasty activities turning into security threats.
Our paper restricts the unauthorized access by communing through only those messages which are encrypted as well as duly signed by the sender. Instead of using two different steps for encrypting the plaintext and then signing it, we have done in single step called as Signcryption. It tremendously reduces the workload, computational cost, bandwidth used, security risks, making the system thoroughly efficient in comparison to the traditional method [2] . On a bad note, the basic signcryption method may lose its significance if a single signcrypted message is supposed to be sent to multiple recipients. Since we are working in groups, everybody in the same group would have the same group key which will ultimately maintain the essence of using signcryption over conventional method. Table 1 depicts the members of group communication which are discussed in Fig. 1 explaining the overall procedure of a normal VANET scenario. All registrations, key distributions, revocations etc are done by the managers assigned, which can bottleneck the system when traffic arises heavily. In normal traffic as well, authorized managers (Membership Manager, MM 1 ) can be down because of any unpredictable cause [3] . Then, the registration and succeeding procedures will be delayed automatically. To avoid such events, alternative managers (MM 2 ) can work temporarily on behalf of original ones and to serve the purpose, proxy re-encryption and proxy re-signature were commenced. Both methods ease the job of managers by assigning their tasks to any subordinate in the system. As the names suggest, messages are to be re-encrypted/re-signed by a proxy working between sender, subordinate and the receiver [4] , [5] . Re-signature does not ease the task, but it makes clients believe that replies are coming from a valid source. In our protocol, we have assumed that MM 1 is currently not able to take registration requests, and has assigned this task to MM 2 . Also, MM 1 has appointed a proxy in between for re-cryptographic operations. Vehicles requesting to register itself in network are denoted by nodes A 1 and A 2 . After entering the network, vehicles transmit BSM (Basic safety messages, which contains current position, brake status, speed, heading acceleration of the vehicle) at regular interval. In case of any accident, vehicle's BSM is collected by TM which is used for tracing the identity and behaviour of that particular vehicle. The interactions involved between members can be given as follows:
( 
A. RECENT TRENDS
VANETs' ever-changing routes and node-locating difficulties interrupt in establishing a secure dynamic system with no trace-passers. As it is quite impossible to get rid of intruders completely, a network should always be ready to face them without letting their privacy affected. Even if it is not an VOLUME 6, 2018 entire network, a simple smart vehicle also has anonymity and authentication concerns needed for secure planning. More advanced VANET system even provides value added services like on-demand multimedia services, payment gateways etc which needs strong anonymity and protection against sensitive data leakage [6] . Hence security is the ultimate aim for VANETs for being able to get deployed on roads.
In recent years, experts have started to implement re-encryption in real time applications like clouds and fogs, which shows it is a promising research topic [7] , [8] . The major obstruction in VANET implementation is the replacement of existing transport system as it is very difficult to switch into a computerized network, till the network is fully developed and secured from attacks/vulnerabilities. It is quite challenging for the developers to make network secure and efficient simultaneously, as most of the secured operations are time-taking, making the algorithm costly. Signcryption has drawn attention of VANET researchers because of its substantial efficiency which gives the freedom for much more scalability [9] . On the other hand identity based signature and re-signature is comparatively a new topic for vehicles but having an active research area indicates its bright future [10] .
With increasing demand, researchers are focusing on hybrid vehicular network where vehicles are able to take advantage of non-VANET entities like mobile phones, smart grids, clouds and other advanced technologies for faster routing, connectivity and charging facilities (in case of electric vehicles) [11] . Before facilitating VANET with these advancements, current technology must be fully secure to avoid any future hitches. Therefore, technology must be robust and secure enough to support this infrastructure less network, even by providing some infra-structure to it.
B. CORE TECHNICAL CONTRIBUTION
The core of our research can be summarized in following points:
1. Integration of Group Signature scheme with Nontransitive Proxy Re-encryption which improves security of the algorithm from basic version. 2. Signcrypting messages instead of signature-thenencryption to save time and space of the network. 3. Introducing proxy re-signature with signcryption in VANET. 4. Formal proof using BAN (Burrows-Abadi-Needham) logic [12] . 5. Simulation using AVISPA (Automated Validation of Internet Security Protocols and Applications), a cryptographic protocol verifier [13] .
C. PAPER ORGANISATION
The paper has been organized in six sections. Section I gives the basic introduction of our research incorporating literature reviews in section II, which covers work done by various authors in this area. Section III proposes our research whereas security and performance analysis is given in section IV and V, respectively. Finally, section VI concludes the paper with potential future scope.
II. LITERATURE REVIEW
Signcryption is the hot topic since it was introduced in 1997 by Zheng [2] . The clear reduction in computation cost as well as message expansion was shown by the author. According to the paper, the expanded bits added to an original message because of the signature can be shrunk to almost 90% if we use the signcryption technique which also saves 50% of the computation and transmission time invested on that particular message. Later, the prospect diverted from simple composition of encryption with signature to breeding the same with already successful techniques in various areas. The first ever SignREcryption was mentioned in 2006 by Ateniese et al. [14] . Although the proposal was to provide security extension to the original re-encryption scheme given by Blaze, Bleumer, and Strauss (BBS) [15] , signcryption drew many scholar's attention, for which they even got their patent published in the year 2012 [16] . They advanced their research with unidirectional identity based re-encryption, overcoming the BBS's bidirectional perspective, in which the identity of a node can be converted to identity of another node with the help of an authenticated proxy [17] . Simultaneously, Canetti and Hohenberger gave an algorithm for Chosen-Ciphertext Secure Proxy Re-Encryption (CH07) against the semantic security procedures presented till that time [18] . Succeeding their groundwork, Ateniese, Benson and Hohenberger published their research on key-private Re-encryption for Chosen Plaintext Attack demonstrating the importance of keeping identities private even for proxies [19] .
Group signatures after being introduced in 1991 was well taken in VANET networks because of its privacy and anonymity features [20] . In 2007, Lin and his team gave a very good article on the security and privacy preservation of VANET networks using the identity based cryptography in group signatures, which asserted to be more feasible than the algorithms having large number of anonymous certificate and long certificate revocation list (CRL) [21] . However, the signature size of an OBU was of 192 bytes incurring a huge communication overhead, hence affecting performance. A refined application friendly group signature was introduced in 2014 by Mamun, Saiful and Miyaji proposing selective linkability with direct traceability, leading to the revocation by re-keying the signature and Verifier Local Revocation [22] . However these revocation schemes are dependent on the number of members either present or joining/leaving the group. Camenisch and Lysyanskaya proposed Dynamic accumulator as a revocation tool that facilitated obtaining a group public key without being dependent on the number of vehicles in a group that means upon any registration or revocation, the number of keys to be updated is not decided by the already accumulated values [23] . In 2017, Kuo and team cryptanalyzed the algorithm and showed that impersonation attack is possible on simple dynamic 59284 VOLUME 6, 2018 FIGURE 2. Our proposed algorithm.
accumulator [24] . To avoid this attack, they used disjoint witness sets in which vehicles cannot impersonate others. Besides providing essential security, the certificate list and group keys are updated only when any member leaves the group making their scheme highly efficient in comparison to the former schemes.
Group based communication inspired the researchers to work on group based re-encryption. Chunbo et al. gave a non-transitive, bi-directional proxy re-encryption approach in which the re-encryption can be done in both direction e.g. re-encryption from A to B and also from B to A [25] . Nevertheless this bidirectional scheme can be used only for those cases where re-encryption is needed in both directions, and both parties must trust each other equally.
Though proxy re-signature is quite new and not been practiced in VANET despite being a secure way to ease the network load, researchers are welcoming it in wireless network rapidly. Recently in 2017, Wei, Yang and Mu proposed a proxy re-signature scheme for wireless networks in which proxy can change the designated verifier whenever required [26] . Most of the time, it is applicable for cases of deniable authentication where both party's designation is verified before communication but if any verified designator is missing, proxy is able to re-sign their documents.
Progressing from the above discussed ongoing researches, we have integrated all the beneficial features into a single algorithm where each entity is used objectively to make our protocol more secure and robust even in hostile conditions.
III. OUR PROPOSED ALGORITHM A. PROBLEM FORMULATION
In this paper, we propose a signcryption technique along with re-encryption and re-signature schemes, called as SRCPR, stands for SignReCrypting Proxy Re-signature which starts with key generation, followed by vehicle registration, signcryption, message verification at the receiver end, and then decryption. Re-encryption, Re-signature and membership revocation are the optional steps which eventuate only at the time when it is required. Fig. 2 represents our proposed algorithm showing how different entities in the network are communicating with each other. At first node A sends registration request RegReq(A to MM 1 ) PK _MM 1 to MM 1 . If MM 1 is not available, the request should be served by MM 2 . Hence, proxy re-encrypts the message and now the message is RegReq(A to MM 1 ) PK _MM 2 encrypted with MM 2 public key which can be decrypted using its private key SK _MM 2. After re-calculating the group signature and updating the accumulator, MM 2 replies to node A with RegRep((MM 2 to A) SK _A ) MM 2_sign , that is encrypted with SK _MM 2 and can be opened by PK _MM 2 only. SK _A denotes the secret key (or identity), which is sent by A along with RegReq, hence it is available with A only. It means only A can decrypt the registration reply. PK _MM 2 is publically available and the message signature can easily be decrypted using it. However, to maintain transparency, proxy re-signs with message that gets converted into RegRep((MM 2 to A) SK _A ) MM 1_sign . Now, vehicle decrypts message using MM 1 's public key and assume that the message was sent by MM 1 only. After receiving group keys, vehicles become active in group and start sending BSM at regular interval. BSM (A) Signcrypted With Group_key is broadcasted by node A in network, which is signcrypted with group keys. All nodes in range receive thisBSM.In case of accidents or suspicious behaviour, TM collects this BSMand calculates V i of the i th vehicle, which is later sent to MM . MM finds the guilty vehicle and revokes in from the group.
B. SIGNIFICANCE OF OUR APPROACH
If MM 1 is overloaded, it can assign its tasks to any other authorized member, named as MM 2 here [27] . MM 2 works VOLUME 6, 2018 as a valid MM , and does all the necessary tasks in absence of MM 1 . It gets the request, decrypts it using its own key, registers the vehicle, updates accumulator, generates registration reply (RegRep), signcrypts it with its own private key and sends it back to the vehicle. With the use of proxy re-signature, confusion between vehicles and managers has been avoided. When vehicle gets RegRep, it does not notice the changes made in between and proceeds with its normal work. Note that, MM 2 signcrypts the message instead of signing and encrypting. Hence, this entire procedure is fully secure, transparent and convenient in which vehicles are not aware of the existence of proxy, avoiding further confusion. 2 = h, where the set (θ 1 , θ 2 ) is the secret key pair of TM for tracing the vehicles [21] . Again, MM chooses π from the set of prime integers as its own private key and generates its public key as w = g π amending the set of system parameters. At last, it takes two secure hash functions H and K e H f and the set of system parameters is published as:
To generate REK and RSK between two entities, their tags and secret keys has been used as given in [5] . Suppose B is MM and C is MM 2 as given above in section A. Then REK and RSK are generated by MM 1 using subtraction operation to make it non-transitive. These keys are sent to the proxy in advance to avoid delays during crisis. The keys can be generated as follows:
2) VEHICLE REGISTRATION
MM broadcasts its public key in the network, in a fixed period of time. Whenever any vehicle enters in the network, it needs to send its identification details requesting membership registration as RegReq, to MM to get authorized as a group member (Fig. 3) . MM extracts vehicle ID I i from RegReq to calculate v i and V i , given RSA modulus N, as:
mod N where gcd (v i , ϕ (N )) = 1 and ACC is the dynamic reversed accumulator [24] . Only (V i , I i ) is stored in the registration table TAB Reg , and v i is calculated whenever needed by the above formula. Vehicle receives (V i , v i ), and registration process completes.
3) SIGNCRYPTION
At first, receiver's public key is hashed with V i to produce K which is broken into two equal parts k 1 and k 2 .
Let α and β be two random secret numbers to compute tracing parameters. Challenger C is used for validating the message at receiver side, hence instead of bare message m, we are encrypting k 1 with to produceĉ, and k 2 is hashed withĉ using a one way keyed hash function, K e H f .
And the message signature σ is:
Now, set (ĉ, s, r) is sent over the network. After receiving these, proxy re-encrypts them into new ciphertext set (c 1 , s, r), which is sent to MM 2 as shown in Fig. 4 .
5) VERIFICATION AND UNSIGNCRYPTION
After receiving the message, MM 2 verifies whether it is from a valid group member in valid time domain, and then decrypts it using its own private key. If receiving time exceeds from the allowable payload time, the message is rejected instantly. At first, the received message is unsigncrypted:
Where s, r is received in the message, gpk is the group public key, π is private key of the receiver, i.e. MM 2 here. Again divide K into k 1 and k 2 to calculate r and eventually C.
Subsequently challenger C is calculated using the parameter received in σ along withĉ [21] . If r and C matches with r and C respectively, it verifies that the message is unaltered and sent by a valid group member, otherwise the message is discarded. 
6) PROXY RE-SIGNATURE
While replying to the message, same procedures are repeated to sign and transmit message into the network. In our algorithm, after replying, re-signature is needed as a consequential action of re-encryption. Since, we re-directed the message to MM 2, which is a third party unknown to the vehicle; we need to make sure that this third party's signature gets converted into original manager's signature. MM 2 always signs RegRep with its own signature, which is picked up and resigned by the proxy using re-signature key, and converting MM 2's signature to MM 1's signature (Fig. 5) . There is no re-encryption during reply as the receiver does not have any representatives. Suppose σ MM2 is sent by MM2 and proxy picks it up to re-sign the message as follows:
After re-singing the message with σ MM 1 , it is again sent in the network from where the corresponding vehicle picks the message and extracts the required RegRep.
7) MEMBERSHIP TRACEABILITY
In case of any accident or suspicious behaviour of vehicles in the network, TM starts its investigation which needs to trace the vehicles using their valid signature sent in BSM. It re-calculates V i using below formula:
3 )mod N Then it sends V i to MM to fetch the corresponding vehicle id stored in the registration table (Fig. 6) . 
8) MEMBERSHIP REVOCATION
If vehicle is not liable anymore, MM revokes it from the group and publishes updated ACC information. We have used dynamic reversed accumulator which gives the liberty to change group keys only at the time of revocation [24] . Table 3 represents the proposed algorithm for membership revocation.
IV. FORMAL VERIFICATION AND SECURITY ANALYSIS OF THE PROPOSED SCHEME A. FORMAL PROOF OF SRCPR
This subsection gives the formal proof of security of our protocol using BAN logic. Secure transmission of messages containing sensitive data has been verified by using this logic given by Burrows, Abadi and Needham in 1989 [12] . This technique formally demonstrates the security goal of the network, and verifies whether these goals have been achieved during message transmission.
The messages are first written in the form of formulae (statements) which consist of principals (network entities, denoted by P, Q) and various keys (denoted by K ). X and Y denote the specific message whereas N a , N b , N c and N d are nonces representing the specific statement [28] . Below are the definitions and their implications which are used to create BAN logic statements:
1. P |≡ X : P believes that message X is true and it can repeat X in its own messages. 2. P | ⇒ X : P has jurisdiction over X and it is controlled by P which infers P can be trusted over the truthiness of X. 3. P| X : P once believed and said X, however it may not believe X now. 4. P X : P receives and sees X which can be read and repeated by P in its own messages. 5. #(X): X is fresh means it was not sent in any message before. 6. key (K, P ←→ Q): P K ←→ Q: P and Q share a secret key K which is known only to either these two or any other third party trusted by them. 7. K → P: K is the public key of P. K −1 is the corresponding private key which must not be known to any other entity in the network. 
P
X ⇐⇒ Q: is shared secret between P and Q which can only be known to a third party which is trusted by them. 9. (X) K : X is encrypted using K. Following are the major implications of above messages:
(P |≡ (Q|≡ X)) To prove the security of our protocol using BAN logic, first we need to perform following steps: 1) Convert messages and keys into idealized message format. 2) These idealized messages will be converted into statements whose format is supported by BAN logic statements. 3) Derive new statements from the annotated statements and infer new rules to show that our protocol is secure.
Step 1: The message transmissions which need to be checked whether those are securely transmitted to destination can be given as:
• M 1 : RegReq{A → MM 1 } : M 1 should be fresh and kept secret only between A, MM 1 or any other third party trusted by them.
• M 2 : RegReq{Proxy → MM 2 }: M 2 should be fresh kept secret only between A, MM 2 or any other third party trusted by them.
• M 3 : RegRep{MM 2 → A} : M 3 should be fresh and kept secret only between A,MM 2 or any other third party trusted by them.
• M 4 : RegRep{Proxy → A} : M 4 should be fresh and kept secret only between MM 2 , A or any other third party trusted by them.
• M 5 : BSM{A → TM} : M 5 should be fresh and duly signed which can be authenticated by TM.
• M 6 : V 1 {TM → MM 1 }: M 6 should be fresh and kept secret between MM 1 and TM only.
Step 2: These messages are converted into idealized form as follows:
Step 3: Annotated form of the above messages which can be directly inferred into BAN logic statements can be given as: 59288 VOLUME 6, 2018
Step 4: Following are the security assumptions for our protocol:
• MM 1 and Proxy share the re-encryption key.
• MM 1 has the re-encryption key and it believes that it is only known to itself and P.
• P sees the re-encryption key which was sent by MM 1 .
• P believes this key is known to P and MM 1 only.
• MM 1 and Proxy share the re-signature key.
• MM 1 has the re-signature key and it believes that it is only known to itself and P.
• P sees the re-signature key which was sent by MM 1 . MM 1 | rs ∧ P rs P| ≡ MM 1 | ≡ rs
• P has the re-signature key and it believes that it is known to itself and MM 1 .
• It is assumed that the pre-shared information, conveyance message and communication channel are safe.
Step 5: Following are the inference rules which is later used to proof safety of our protocol:
• Message Origin Rule, as shown as the first equation at the bottom of this page.
• Nonce Freshness Rule, as shown as the second equation at the bottom of this page.
Step 6 (Goal Analysis): In this protocol, though the messages are not received and replied by original manager MM 1 , 
The confidentiality between MM 2 and A is maintained as, shown as the third equation at the bottom of the previous page.
Only A knows and MM 2 received this in a key encrypted with its own public key, MM 2 believes that A has sent the message. Similarly, A knows the public key of MM 1 is SK MM1 and can decrypt Nb, A 3 (A5(Nb, G_sign) I i ) SK MM1 with PK MM1 and it extracts the inside message which is again encrypted with its own ID I i , hence A| ≡ (MM 2 (Na, A5 (Na, Ii) PK MM1 )) and it is concluded that A| ≡ MM 1 | (Nb, A 3 (A5(Nb, G_sign) I i ) SK MM1 ).
B. FORMAL VERIFICATION USING AVISPA
The main security objective of our protocol is to secure the keys and authenticate the messages which have been transmitted in the network. In our scheme, we have different scenarios, like vehicle registration, key distributions, BSM transmission, etc. The security of the transmitted messages of these scenarios has been verified by AVISPA tool. For our understanding and transparency, we have not used detailed expressions or calculations in the simulation window, and have shown only the final results. Though every node can receive messages, only influencing objects has been shown here. For example, when MM 2 sends its public keys in the network, vehicles receive it as well, but they do not know the existence of MM 2 as manager, so they do not pay any attention to it. In Fig. 7 , the events of a scenario are given, where vehicle registers itself in the absence of MM1, with the help of MM2. 
C. SECURITY ANALYSIS
This section represents the analysis of proposed protocol to show their security against various attacks. The achieved security goals have been explored below in various properties which is compared to other protocols in Table 5 Property 2 (Non-Transitivity): As given in key generation section, re-encryption key rk b→c and re-signature key rs c→b are generated using subtraction operation. These keys are generated by MM 1 and sent to proxy. Even if the proxy is having two re-encryption keys, rk a→b and rk b→c , it is unable to generate a third re-encryption keys rk a→c unlike in AH06, BBS98, and CH07 [5] , [15] , [18] schemes. Since re-encryption key between MM 1 and MM 2 can be generated only if private key of MM 1 or shared secret keys between MM 1 and MM 2 available with proxy because it can be generated as rk a→b = (ϕ − π) b −1 a , and if we divide
we can never get (ϕ1 − π2) c −1 a unlike in above mentioned approaches. The same applies with the re-signature keys where proxy is never able to generate rs a→c using rs a→b and rs b→c by just dividing them as explained above.
Property 3 (Resists Impersonation Attack):
If an unauthorised user is able to send messages on behalf of a legal user by impersonating his identity without even knowing the legitimate password/secret-key, then it is called impersonation attack [29] . In our protocol, the major essence of re-encryption is that MM 2 is able to reply on behalf of MM 1 whenever later is not available. Hence, it is definite that MM 2 is going to reply for MM 1's messages, and former's signature will be converted to latter's signature. Although this re-encryption and re-signature allow the proxy to re-encrypt the ciphertext set (ĉ, s, r) into (c 1 , s, r), and to re-sign the reply with σ MM 1 instead of σ MM 2 , keys for this re-cryptography can only be received from MM 1 . These keys are generated for specific purposes like registration or revocation, and when the service of MM 2 is not required, the services can be put on halt. Proxy cannot redirect or re-encrypt on its own will, resulting in no un-authorized impersonation.
Property 4 (Resists Sybil Attack): Every vehicle needs to register itself in group before they can communicate as a valid group member. They send their vehicle ID, I i to MM 1 and gets themselves register in the registration table TAB REG . For each ID, a corresponding V i is calculated and group signature is updated based on that, which is sent back to the vehicle. Vehicles messages are authenticated only if it is signed with group signature. Since vehicle can register only once, there is no possibility of multiple V i assigned to any vehicle. Moreover, TM always monitors on the nodes of its group, and if any suspicious behaviour is there, that member is revoked from the group, which prevents Sybil attack to take place.
Property 5 (Resists Unauthorized Backward Traceability):
In our scheme, unique identity of a vehicle, either I i or V i , is never revealed to another vehicle, hence no one is able to trace back to the actual sender using BSM collected from the network. Since, sender cannot be tracked through the BSM sent by him, no history related to its path, daily routine, type of messages etc can be observed. Hence, adversary is never able to guess from a message that this type of message can be sent from which vehicle; hence unauthorized backward traceability is not possible.
Property 6 (Resists an Intruder to Create Secure Channel):
Any vehicle can start communication in a group only if it is having group signature which can be given by MM 1 . Details of a vehicle is stored in TAB REG and any misbehaviour can lead to revocation from group. Hence, an intruder cannot create secure channel with the group member. Fig. 8 shows the simulation window where intruder is able to get only ciphertext and public keys, which is not enough to establish a channel with the legitimate members. Our proposed approach does not let any secret keys to be revealed in the network. As the simulation scenario considers intervention of an intruder, which is continuously listening to the communication, but cannot extract any secret key, sk. For example in step 5, intruder picks up {sk-5}_pk-3.{sk-4}_pk-3 but since it does not have sk-3, it cannot decrypt the message, and hence sk-5andsk-4 i.e. REK and RSK are safe.
Property 7 (Resists Password Guessing Attack):
The secret keys are derived using ElGamal encryption, and are duly encrypted with receiver's public key before sending it in the network. Only MM is aware of the secret key which is used to generate group keys and it is never transmitted in the network. MM 1 only transmits public keys, group variables and parameters in network as ( w, a 1 , a 2 , h) , which does not reveal any previous password as well. ElGamal encryption ensures that corresponding private key of a public key cannot be derived from the above information available. If, any member is revoked from any group, the group signature is immediately updated by calculating dynamic reverse accumulator ACC as ACC v −1 j mod ϕ(N ) mod n. Moreover, random key maintains the freshness of newly generated keys which does not let an intruder to guess the password. MM 2 ) , it first checks the received TS (shown as nonce Na here). If it is within permissible time limit, it decrypts the message. Then it finds out TS from inside, if both TS are matching, it means TS has not been tampered in between. If after decrypting MM 2 finds any different TS not Na, it means the timestamp was tampered in between MM 2 and the sender, hence it discard the message assuming it as a replay attack. Similarly, M 3 and M 4 have same timestamp Nb, which helps the node to prevent replay attack. When vehicle sends BSM as (Nc, A 3 (BSM , Nc) G Sign ), vehicle signs Nc first before sending it which indicates the authenticity of timestamp from a legitimate user. If that legitimate user is compromised and trying to initiate replay attack, TM marks its activities and reports to MM , that eventually leads that node to be terminated from group.
Property 9 (Resists Man In Middle Attack):
As explained above, no node can impersonate any other node, proxy is having only limited capability, past messages does not reveal any secret session keys, a third key cannot be derived from any given two keys and messages are protected with TS, hence impersonation attack is not possible in any scenario. Fig. 8 shows the scenario, where an intruder wants to attack from the middle of the network. It collects ciphertext and nonces from network as shown in Fig. 9 , but fails to retrieve any secret information from it. 
Property 10 (Resists Message Modification And Forgeability Attack):
Since messages sent in network are duly encrypted with signcryption keys, it is not possible to modify message/signature in between. If tempered in between, won't match with C at the receiver side, and the received packet will be discarded, eventually. Hence, it is not possible to deceive the receiver after modifying the message or forging the signature in between. Fig. 10 depicts the security of our experiment using AVISPA tool. The tool analysed 10878 states and traversed 3410 states to declare that our protocol is SAFE which means we successfully achieve our security requirements, and prove that keys are safe and no unauthenticated vehicle is able to extract the information from the ciphertext.
Property 11 (Resists Denial Of Service Attack):
Each vehicle in network transmits BSM at particular interval of time which contains its location, speed, heading etc. Compromised vehicle can send incorrect information, or even if it sent correct information at that time, it can later try to deny from the fact that it has sent the message. Each BSM is signed with group signature as A 3 (BSM , Nc) G_Sign , from which TM is able to trace V i and MM is able to find I i , the real identity of the vehicle, hence vehicle cannot deny from the fact that it transmitted that particular message. MM 1 and MM 2 reply to registration requests as A 3 (A 5 (Nb, G_Sign) I i ) SK MM 1 and
which is signed with their private keys and can be decrypted only with their private keys. Hence, later they cannot deny from their services.
Property 12 (Intervention of Ex-Member Of Group): Any member of a group is having group keys, so if intervenes in the group even after leaving the group it can become a big threat. Hence, after a member leaves or accumulator by recalculating ACC as ACC v −1 j mod ϕ(N ) mod n and make entry in TAB REG and TAB REV , to keep record up-to-date. Even if the revoked vehicle applies for registration, MM 1 first checks TAB REV before taking any further action. Since, group keys are changed now, and rest of the group member is aware of the new keys, ex-member cannot communicate as a valid group member anymore.
V. PERFORMANCE ANALYSIS OF THE PROPOSED PROTOCOL
Performance analysis in VANET majorly concerns about the CPU cycle consumption to prepare the message, bandwidth and latency of a message transmission. Total number of CPU cycles needed by our protocol in preparing a duly signed message is given in below section Computation Overhead. The total cost incurred in the proposed protocol has been analyzed on two main criteria; size of the message, and time taken to generate it. Message size determines the bandwidth or number of packets needed for that message, ultimately affects latency, and is given in next section Communication Overhead. Table 4 represents the message format and size of different parameters included in it. Table 6 and Table 7 gives the size of different parameters, and cost of different operations respectively. The unit of parameter size is bit, unit of cost is millisecond, and these parameter values are adopted from [30] - [32] . Table 8 and 9 give the calculative comparison and Table 10 manifests the contributive comparison of various protocols, imperative to our discussion here.
A. COMPUTATION OVERHEAD
In SRCPR, cost is mainly calculated for signRecryption which means CPU cycles needed for signcrypting and re-encrypting the message. Since, most of the existing algorithms do not provide both features (Table 10) ; and a direct cost comparison is not possible, we have compared our algorithm separately on the separate features. The comparison analysis has covered the research not just in VANET, but also in other wireless network.
We have also compared our protocol with handoff algorithms considering proxy re-encryption as a possible solution for handling handoffs as well. Since MM 2 is there to help with registration of vehicles, the coverable area is wider, that means if connected with mobile devices in future, there will be lesser handoffs. Our message signature has lowest computation cost (Table 8) except [33] proposed by Sayu et al. [33] because just shows steps of signcryption regardless of the network. Table 9 represents the re-encryption costs of different algorithm in which we can observe that our algorithm has third minimum cost among all protocols, lagging behind [15] and [18] , but both these algorithms have their flaws to deal with. Though least cost has been claimed by BBS algorithm in [15] , this algorithm just proposes a basic re-encryption technique, and does not take security parameters into consideration. The REK generated by [18] is transitive and hence a compromised proxy can take advantage of two REKs to generate a third REK. Therefore, our algorithm is the best cost effective approach among all these algorithms. The comparison charts of signature cost and re-encryption cost is given in Fig. 11 and Fig. 12, respectively. Table 6 shows the comprehensive list of parameters with their sizes, which has been used to compute total communication overhead incurred. To compute the length of our signature, we need to get the size of different parameters. Since each key is sized of 128 bits, and challenger is the result of hash function also resulting in 128 bits, size of message signature can be calculated as 544 bits = 68 bytes which is way shorter than other existing algorithms given in Table 8 . The comparison chart of the same is given in Fig. 13 , which shows that our protocol offers the minimum signature size.
B. COMMUNICATION OVERHEAD

VI. CONCLUSION AND FUTURE WORK
The proposed protocol eases the task of managers by providing a secure alternative to redistribute their workload. The additional calculations involved in re-encryption and re-signature could have decreased the throughput due to elevated transmission time, but signcryption saves considerable amount of computational cost by combining encryption and signature into a single step which improves throughput, making our algorithm more significant than others. Re-signature reduces the response time by allowing multiple ports to listen to the incoming requests. Our algorithm is an efficient solution for heavily loaded networks where managers are bottlenecked with registrations requests and vehicle tracking. If network is not overloaded, role of proxy can be paused for the time being. The results are verified using AVISPA which shows that the proposed protocol is safe. To the best of our knowledge, this approach is the first signcryption algorithm in VANET, which gives the efficient version of re-encryption and re-signature.
In future, to make the proposed protocol more cost effective, we will work on the possibilities of reducing the number of exponential functions and multiplications used in this algorithm.
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